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MILKOVICH, #METOO, AND “LIARS”:  




Since the start of the #MeToo movement, sexual assault survivors have 
increasingly turned defamation law against their alleged assaulters.  In these 
#MeToo defamation cases, an alleged victim publicly claims that another 
person, usually someone of considerable wealth and fame, sexually assaulted 
them.  The alleged assaulter then calls their accuser a liar, causing their 
accuser to sue their alleged assaulter for defamation.  These cases have 
consistently raised an element of the defamation analysis that has long 
challenged courts:  distinguishing between statements of actionable “fact” 
and nonactionable “opinion.” 
#MeToo defamation cases raise the question of whether an alleged 
assaulter’s claim that their accuser lied constitutes actionable fact or 
nonactionable opinion.  The U.S. Supreme Court attempted to provide 
guidance on how to conduct fact-opinion analyses in a case similar to 
#MeToo cases, where a plaintiff sued the defendant for calling them a liar.  
However, U.S. courts diverge in their approaches to the fact-opinion analysis 
and have come to varying results on the fact-opinion question in #MeToo 
defamation cases. 
This Note argues that, when properly applied, the fact-opinion distinction 
does not shield alleged assailants from defamation liability because the 
alleged assailants’ claims that their alleged victims lied constitute implicit 
assertions of eyewitness testimony about a factual matter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The emotional cost alone of bringing up such memories publicly . . . is pure 
bankruptcy. . . .  It is the deep end of a pool where I cannot swim.  It is a 
famous man telling you that you are a liar for what you have remembered. 
—Amber Tamblyn1 
Over the course of a year, the #MeToo movement2 led to sexual 
misconduct allegations against at least 425 prominent figures across various 
industries in the United States.3  Notable examples of alleged4 sexual 
 
 1. Amber Tamblyn, Opinion, Amber Tamblyn:  I’m Done with Not Being Believed, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/16/opinion/sunday/amber-
tamblyn-james-woods.html [https://perma.cc/R5BS-JCZJ] (speaking about actor James 
Woods’s attempt to pick the author up when she was underage). 
 2. Tarana Burke originally created the “Me Too” campaign in 2007. Sandra E. Garcia, 
The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html 
[https://perma.cc/8L6K-6VKK].  Subsequently, “Me Too” was popularized as a hashtag 
following Alyssa Milano’s October 2017 tweet, which Milano published as a response to then-
recent sexual assault allegations against Harvey Weinstein. Alyssa Milano 
(@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 4:21 PM), https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/ 
status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/623A-C5YU].  The #MeToo movement gives 
a voice to sexual harassment victims, and “give[s] people a sense of the magnitude of the 
problem.” Id. 
 3. Riley Griffin et al., #MeToo:  One Year Later, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2018), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-me-too-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/Q9WZ-HWS5]. 
 4. Bill Cosby is the only #MeToo figure to have been convicted of sexual assault as of 
September 26, 2019. See Morning Edition:  Bill Cosby and the #MeToo Movement, NPR 
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/26/651710715/bill-cosby-and-the-metoo-
movement [https://perma.cc/5J4V-GPBZ].  As of October 6, 2019, Cosby is appealing this 
conviction. See Jon Hurdle, Bill Cosby’s Appeal Begins with Sharp Questioning by Judges, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/arts/television/bill-cosby-
new-trial-appeal.html [https://perma.cc/8YWK-64YH]. 
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assaulters include Donald Trump,5 Harvey Weinstein,6 Jeffrey Epstein,7 and 
Brett Kavanaugh.8  Responses from the accused figures have largely 
consisted of denials.9  Several sexual assault accusations, followed by alleged 
assailants’ denials,10 have led to defamation suits.11 
The defamation suits involving Bill Cosby illustrate the nature of these 
claims.  After several women publicly claimed that Bill Cosby sexually 
assaulted them, Cosby’s attorney made statements to the media on Cosby’s 
behalf12 that not only denied these claims but either implied that the women 
were liars13 or explicitly called the women liars.14  In response, a number of 
these women sued Cosby for defamation, in each case alleging that, in calling 
her a “liar” through his attorney, he damaged her reputation.15  Cosby replied 
 
 5. See Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App. 
Div. 2019). 
 6. See Bill Chappell, Judge Dismisses Ashley Judd’s Sexual Harassment Claim Against 
Harvey Weinstein, NPR (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/10/683993516/judge-
dismisses-ashley-judds-sexual-harassment-claim-against-harvey-weinstein [https://perma.cc/ 
GQP9-EKWT] (stating that Judd’s defamation claim could move forward). 
 7. See Ali Watkins & Vivian Wang, Jeffrey Epstein Is Accused of Luring Girls to His 
Manhattan Mansion and Abusing Them, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-sex-trafficking.html 
[https://perma.cc/2A2J-EYK5]. 
 8. See Full Transcript:  Christine Blasey Ford’s Opening Statement to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, POLITICO (Sept. 26, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2018/09/26/christine-blasey-ford-opening-statement-senate-845080 [https://perma.cc/K4KJ-
ZAHM]. 
 9. See Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein:  71 Men Accused of Sexual Misconduct 
and Their Fall from Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html [https://perma.cc/8XWW-
VUBK]; Post-Weinstein, These Are the Powerful Men Facing Sexual Harassment Allegations, 
GLAMOUR (May 18, 2019), https://www.glamour.com/gallery/post-weinstein-these-are-the-
powerful-men-facing-sexual-harassment-allegations [https://perma.cc/JU39-ZWFH]. 
 10. This Note uses legalistic terms to refer to the legal stage of accusations and the 
technical positions of the parties involved.  Women who have publicly accused someone of 
assaulting them and are plaintiffs in #MeToo defamation suits are referred to as “accusers” or 
a variation thereof.  Likewise, those accused of sexual assault, the defendants in these 
defamation suits, are referred to as “the accused,” or another such variation.  The purpose of 
this terminological choice is to avoid confusion as to whether the sexual assault crime 
underlying the defamation claim was tried in court.  In the #MeToo defamation suits discussed 
in this Note, the sexual assaults underlying the defamation claims were not pursued in a 
criminal law capacity, and the alleged victims also did not pursue civil claims against their 
alleged assaulters. 
 11. Daniel Jackson, Sex-Assault Accusers Turn to Defamation Lawsuits in #MeToo Era, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/sex-assault-
accusers-turn-to-defamation-lawsuits-in-metoo-era/ [https://perma.cc/VCY5-S7GJ]. 
 12. See infra notes 76–78. 
 13. See Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2016); Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 
3d 114, 121–23 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 14. See Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430, 439 (Ct. App. 2017) (presenting the 
content of Singer’s denial, wherein he describes Janice Dickinson’s rape allegation as “an 
outrageous defamatory lie”); see also Jackson, supra note 11. 
 15. See Hill, 665 F. App’x at 173; Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 121; Dickinson, 225 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d at 441. 
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that, because it was merely his opinion that the respective women were liars, 
he was protected from defamation liability.16 
When a defamation defendant claims the allegedly defamatory statement 
constitutes nonactionable opinion, the court engages in a fact-opinion 
analysis to determine whether the defamation claim can move forward.17  
Thus, a key inquiry in #MeToo defamation cases is whether a claim that a 
sexual assault accuser is a “liar” constitutes nonactionable opinion or 
actionable fact.18 
Courts have come to differing conclusions on whether the defendants in 
these defamation suits may avoid liability through an opinion defense,19 in 
part because courts across the country utilize different fact-opinion 
analyses.20  This variation exists despite the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has provided a fact-opinion framework in this very context.  In Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co.,21 the defendant called the plaintiff a liar in a newspaper 
column relating to a controversial high school sporting event.22  The Court 
clarified how the fact-opinion analysis should be conducted and found that 
the “liar” allegation was actionable.23  However, lower courts have 
subsequently used different analyses and arrived at different conclusions on 
whether a “liar” allegation is actionable.24 
A pair of Bill Cosby #MeToo defamation cases involving the exact same 
“liar” statement demonstrate the issue.  In this statement, Cosby’s attorney 
characterized the sexual assault allegations as “unsubstantiated, fantastical 
stories . . . [that] have escalated far past the point of absurdity” and that “it is 
completely illogical” that anyone would wait decades to give any indication 
 
 16. See, e.g., Hill, 665 F. App’x at 171–72; Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 121–22; Dickinson, 
225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 439–40. 
 17. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1990) (describing the 
transition from the common law’s lack of distinction between statements of fact and opinion 
to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence forming such a distinction); see also infra Part II 
(describing #MeToo and #MeToo-related cases in which courts analyzed the fact-opinion 
question after the defamation defendants argued that they were shielded from liability because 
their allegedly defamatory statements were opinions). 
 18. See infra Part I.C (demonstrating that the “fact-opinion” distinction is more complex 
than distinguishing between facts and opinions to determine whether a statement is actionable 
for defamation).  However, scholarship and court opinions continue to use the “fact-opinion” 
phraseology in reference to current methods of defamation analysis, and so this Note will 
likewise do the same. 
 19. Compare Hill, 665 F. App’x 169 (finding that the alleged assaulter prevailed on the 
fact-opinion question), and Dickinson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (finding that the alleged assaulter 
prevailed on the fact-opinion question), with Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (finding that the 
accuser prevailed on the fact-opinion question), and Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442 (Sup. 
Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App. Div. 2019) (finding that the accuser prevailed on the 
fact-opinion question). 
 20. See infra Part II (illustrating the variety of fact-opinion analyses utilized by courts, 
even when different courts use the same type of analysis). 
 21. 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 22. Id. at 3. 
 23. See infra Part I.C.2 (explaining the Court’s holding). 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
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that they had been assaulted.25  In Hill v. Cosby,26  the Third Circuit ruled 
that this statement constituted nonactionable opinion.27  But in Green v. 
Cosby,28 the District of Massachusetts held that this statement was actionable 
fact.29 
The #MeToo movement continues to raise important discussions about the 
prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace, power dynamics, and the 
cultural and systemic responses to these issues.30  Events like Brett 
Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing31 and the emergence of #MeToo abroad32 
demonstrate that the movement is gathering momentum.  Participants in the 
#MeToo movement will likely continue to use defamation as a legal tool,33  
making it important to clarify the fact-opinion analysis so that litigants can 
rely on more predictable results. 
This Note addresses how the fact-opinion distinction should be applied to 
#MeToo “liar” cases.  It argues that a proper application of Milkovich leads 
to a core feature of #MeToo defamation cases that courts have not adequately 
considered—the defendant’s role as a first-person witness in the alleged 
sexual assault underlying the defamation claim.  Part I provides an overview 
 
 25. Hill, 665 F. App’x at 172; Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 122. 
 26. 665 F. App’x 169 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 27. Id. at 175–77. 
 28. 138 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 29. Id. at 132, 134. 
 30. See generally Kim Elsesser, The Latest Consequence of #MeToo:  Not Hiring Women, 
FORBES (Sept. 5, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2019/09/05/the-
latest-consequence-of-metoo-not-hiring-women/ [https://perma.cc/CYH8-85M6]; Gene 
Marks, When Men Are Afraid to Interact with Women at Work, It Harms the Whole Company, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/sep/05/ 
when-men-are-afraid-to-interact-with-women-at-work-it-harms-the-whole-company 
[https://perma.cc/47G9-VW7U]. 
 31. See Clare Foran, After Outpouring of Personal Stories, Congress Still Grappling with 
Kavanaugh Confirmation Fallout, CNN (Oct. 20, 2018, 8:08 AM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2018/10/20/politics/metoo-congress-women-harassment-assault/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/RRM3-HJC9]. 
 32. A notable example is #MeToo’s arrival in India. See Manveena Suri, India’s #MeToo 
Moment?:  Media and Entertainment Industry Shaken by Allegations, CNN (Oct. 18, 2018, 
8:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/10/asia/india-metoo-intl/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/EB6J-H87V]. 
 33. See Ethan Krasnoo, Exploring the Role of Defamation in the #MeToo Narrative, 
REAVIS PAGE JUMP LLP (Sept. 21, 2018), https://rpjlaw.com/exploring-defamation-metoo-
narrative/ [https://perma.cc/Z5QY-B5P9] (opining that “defamation will continue to play a 
large role in the #MeToo movement”).  Additionally, there are #MeToo defamation cases that 
have only been heard on procedural matters, as of January 4, 2019. See, e.g., Bernstein v. 
O’Reilly, 307 F. Supp. 3d 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (denying Bill O’Reilly’s motion to seal 
particular agreements filed in connection with his motion to compel arbitration and/or dismiss 
the complaint); Ex parte Moore, No. 1170638, 2018 WL 3947715 (Ala. Aug. 17, 2018) 
(affirming the lower court’s denial of Roy Moore’s motion for change of venue).  There are 
also #MeToo defamation claims that have yet to be filed. See, e.g., Chappell, supra note 6 
(explaining that Ashley Judd’s defamation suit against Harvey Weinstein will move forward); 
James B. Stewart, Rachel Abrams & Ellen Gabler, “If Bobbie Talks, I’m Finished”:  How Les 
Moonves Tried to Silence an Accuser, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/11/28/business/les-moonves-bobbie-phillips-marv-dauer-cbs-severance.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SVN-HWVP] (stating that Bobbie Phillips has hired a lawyer to pursue 
defamation claims against Les Moonves). 
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of defamation law and its use in the #MeToo era and explores how the fact-
opinion distinction has evolved.  Part II explores how courts have applied 
fact-opinion analyses in defamation claims that are factually similar to 
Milkovich, including in #MeToo cases.  Finally, Part III proposes a fact-
opinion analysis that is more consistent with Milkovich and that focuses on 
the defamation defendant’s possession of undisclosed facts as a consequence 
his34 role as a first-person witness in the underlying alleged sexual assault. 
I.  DEFAMATION LAW AND THE FACT-OPINION DISTINCTION 
The First Amendment represents the United States’ strong cultural 
interests in the freedom of speech.35  The right to free expression is balanced 
against individuals’ common law right to reputation, which is protected 
under defamation law.36 
Alleged sexual assaulters have historically used defamation law against 
their accusers.  However, sexual assault accusers have begun using 
defamation law against their alleged assaulters in the #MeToo era to protect 
their own reputations from claims that they lied about their assaults.37  These 
defamation suits have raised new legal questions38 but have more notably 
perpetuated the inconsistent fact-opinion distinction.39 
Part I.A provides a brief overview of defamation law.  Part I.B then 
outlines the use of defamation law in the context of sexual assault and 
#MeToo defamation cases.  Finally, Part I.C describes the critical Supreme 
Court case Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. and its impact on the fact-opinion 
distinction. 
A.  Defamation:  A Mechanism for Reputational Protection 
The law of defamation protects against the reputational harm that a written 
or spoken statement causes to the subject of the statement.40  “Defamation” 
 
 34. But see Quentin Fottrell, A Difficult #MeToo Question:  How Many Women Are 
Accused of Sexual Harassment?, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 26, 2018, 6:42 PM), https:// 
www.marketwatch.com/story/a-difficult-metoo-question-how-many-women-are-accused-of-
sexual-harassment-2018-08-21 [https://perma.cc/S6JN-YMF3] (demonstrating that women 
have also been accused of sexual assault and explaining the difficulty of calculating how many 
alleged assailants are women). 
 35. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 36. See Bryson Kern, Note, Reputational Injury Without Reputational Attack:  Addressing 
Negligence Claims for Pure Reputational Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 257–58 (2014) 
(describing the importance of reputation and the harms resulting from an attack on reputation). 
 37. See infra Part I.B. 
 38. See infra Part I.B (discussing the self-defense privilege and attorneys’ liability under 
defamation law for statements made on behalf of their clients, both issues which have been 
raised in recent #MeToo defamation cases). 
 39. See infra Part II. 
 40. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines “defamation” as “[a] communication 
[which] tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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operates as a generic catchall term for the twin torts of libel and slander.41  
Libel specifically refers to defamation through words embodied in a tangible 
form, whether written or printed, and slander refers to defamation through 
gestures or spoken words.42 
At common law, defamation was “essentially a strict liability tort with 
most rules stacked in the plaintiff’s favor.”43  The common law cause of 
action required only an unprivileged, false, and defamatory publication that 
was either “actionable irrespective of special harm” or was “the legal cause 
of special harm to the other.”44  However, a common law plaintiff did not 
have to show that the allegedly defamatory statement actually harmed their 
reputation,45 was false,46 or was made with any degree of malice or fault.47  
Thus, common law defamation enabled a plaintiff to prevail against a 
defendant with relative ease.48 
Beginning in 1964,49 a series of Supreme Court decisions placed First 
Amendment restrictions on common law defamation, balancing the 
traditional recognition of reputational interests with the constitutional 
protection of free speech.50  New burdens were placed on defamation 
plaintiffs with the introduction of new analytical elements,51 making it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on their defamation claims.  The modern 
cause of action requires that a speaker communicate a false, defamatory, and 
 
 41. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:10 (2d ed. 2018).  For the purpose of 
this Note, “defamation” will act as a catchall term for both libel and slander.  This Note uses 
the terms “speaker” and “publisher” interchangeably, with no intent to invoke either written 
or spoken statements specifically but rather to invoke defamatory or allegedly defamatory 
statements generally. See also id. § 1:15 (further detailing how prima facie cases for libel and 
slander differ). 
 42. Id. § 1:11. 
 43. Id. § 1:4. 
 44. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1938).  In defamation law, 
special harm refers to pecuniary loss “capable of being measured in money with approximate 
exactness.” Id. § 575 cmt. b. 
 45. Id. § 559 cmt. d. 
 46. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 1:8. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. § 1:7.  Quoting Lord Mansfield, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. noted that, in 
common law defamation, “[w]hatever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril.” Peck v. 
Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909). 
 49. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 50. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (reiterating the Supreme 
Court’s “recognition of the [First] Amendment’s vital guarantee of free and uninhibited 
discussion of public issues” and recognizing societal interest in reputation as “another side to 
the equation”); see also SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 1:1 (stating that “[a] free, open, and decent 
society values the free exchange of news and information, but also demands avenues of redress 
for damaging falsehoods”).  Contrast with Australia’s “strict defamation laws,” which require 
“the publisher to prove that the [defamation] allegations are true [and] ‘can be used to stymie 
public debate.’” Clarissa Sebag-Montefiore, Geoffrey Rush’s Defamation Trial Becomes a 
#MeToo Reckoning for Australia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/11/06/world/australia/geoffrey-rush-metoo-defamation.html [https://perma.cc/LWL7-
5FCL] (quoting Matt Collins, a Victoria-based defamation lawyer). 
 51. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (establishing that public official plaintiffs must prove 
that allegedly defamatory statements were made with a fault level of “actual malice,” with 
knowledge or reckless disregard as to a statement’s falsity). 
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unprivileged statement to another with fault consisting of, at minimum, 
negligence.52  Further, the relevant constitutional minimum requirements 
change depending on whether a plaintiff is a public or private person53 and 
whether the defamatory speech concerns a public or private matter.54  
Additionally, states vary as to whether they impose a stricter fault 
requirement than actual malice and when they impose special harm 
requirements.55 
Defamation has therefore evolved to incorporate more free speech 
protections, to the defendant’s benefit. 
B.  Defamation Law’s Use in the #MeToo Era 
Historically, alleged sexual assaulters, rather than their accusers, have 
utilized defamation lawsuits where an alleged sexual assault underlies the 
defamation claim.56  In response to being accused of sexual assault, alleged 
assailants file defamation suits against their accusers to protect their own 
reputations.57 
The possibility of such retaliation58 discourages victims from reporting 
their sexual assaults.59  With defamation suits, accused assaulters can 
circumvent rape shield laws designed to prevent admission of victims’ past 
sexual histories as evidence in sexual assault cases.60  This is because rape 
 
 52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  The exact 
requirements include “(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an 
unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part 
of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or 
the existence of special harm caused by the publication.” Id. 
 53. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (extending the “actual 
malice” fault requirement to public figures). 
 54. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (extending the “actual 
malice” fault requirement to private persons making claims regarding allegedly defamatory 
statements about matters of public concern). 
 55. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 1:34. 
 56. See Jackson, supra note 11. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Other forms of retaliation in response to reporting sexual assaults include further 
sexual assault, threats, and violence. Leah M. Slyder, Note, Rape in the Civil and 
Administrative Contexts:  Proposed Solutions to Problems in Tort Cases Brought by Rape 
Survivors, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 543, 552 (2017). 
 59. In 2016, about 80 percent of sexual assaults and rapes went unreported, making it the 
most underreported violent crime. RACHEL E. MORGAN & GRACE KENA, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 252121, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2016:  REVISED 7 (2018), https:// 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16re.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YR4-2UVT] (reporting that in 
2016, 23.2 percent of rapes or sexual assaults were reported, compared with 57 percent of 
robberies, 43.9 percent of assaults, 52.2 percent of domestic violence crimes, 43.6 percent of 
stranger violence crimes, and 48 percent of violent crimes involving injury).  Although 
reporting inconsistencies make it difficult to accurately measure how frequently sexual 
assaults are falsely reported, statistics show that false reporting rates range between 2 and 10 
percent. NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., FALSE REPORTING 3 (2012), https:// 
www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/Publications_NSVRC_Overview_False-Reporting.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7F8L-SXEP]. 
 60. Slyder, supra note 58, at 553–54 (describing a case where the alleged sexual assaulter 
sued his accuser for defamation and “[t]he trial focused on the role that [the victim] played in 
her own sexual assault”); see also Leslie Berkseth et al., Rape and Sexual Assault, 18 GEO. J. 
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shield laws, which are relatively weak to begin with,61 do not extend to civil 
proceedings in most states.62 
The threat of defamation suits thus operates as a strong deterrent63 to 
sexual assault victims bringing claims against their assaulters.64  For 
example, as a possible backlash to the #MeToo movement, alleged sexual 
assaulters on college campuses are now more likely to file defamation suits 
against victims who report their assaulters.65  Likewise, public figures 
accused of sexual assault have also brought defamation suits against their 
alleged victims.66 
However, alleged sexual assault victims have also recently begun turning 
to defamation claims as a cause of action against their alleged assaulters.67  
These defamation suits raise other legal questions, in addition to the fact-
opinion distinction, that have not yet been thoroughly explored. 
One example is the common law self-defense privilege.68  In some 
jurisdictions, defamation defendants may successfully claim this defense if 
 
GENDER & L. 743, 799 (2017) (stating that “rape shield laws do not generally protect civil 
litigants”). 
 61. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License:  Sexual 
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 55 (2002) (stating that “rape 
shield laws admit[] evidence of the sexual history between the complainant and the defendant 
himself”).  Anderson also argues against certain provisions in Rule 412 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence that allow sexual history to be admitted as evidence under certain circumstances. 
Id. at 55–56. 
 62. Slyder, supra note 58, at 553–54. 
 63. Other strong deterrents to reporting sexual assault include victim-blaming and 
victimization by the criminal justice system itself. Id. at 550–53.  Dr. Christine Blasey Ford, 
who testified at Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing that he sexually assaulted her in high 
school, is a notable example of an alleged sexual assault victim who was publicly victim-
blamed. See Full Transcript:  Christine Blasey Ford’s Opening Statement to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, supra note 8.  Dr. Ford noted in her opening statement, “I have had to 
relive my trauma in front of the entire world, and have seen my life picked apart by people on 
television, in the media, and in [the Senate Judiciary Committee] who have never met me or 
spoken with me.” Id. 
 64. But see Mark Morales, #MeToo Cited as One Reason Rape Reports Increased 22% in 
New York in 2018, CNN (Jan. 3, 2019, 7:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/03/us/nypd-
crime-stats-briefing/index.html [https://perma.cc/9PWU-UVT4] (describing the #MeToo 
movement’s positive effect on increased rape reports in New York City in 2018). 
 65. See Kelly Alison Behre, Ensuring Choice and Voice for Campus Sexual Assault 
Victims:  A Call for Victims’ Attorneys, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 293, 356–61 (2017). 
 66. See, e.g., Maggie Astor, Roy Moore Sues 4 Women, Claiming Defamation and 
Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/ 
us/politics/roy-moore-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/2QVC-AUP6]; Daniel Kreps, Drake 
Files Fraud Lawsuit Against Woman Over False Pregnancy, Rape Claims, ROLLING STONE 
(Sept. 19, 2018, 2:29 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-news/drake-fraud-
lawsuit-false-pregnancy-rape-claims-726305/ [https://perma.cc/6BFW-5CE5]. 
 67. See Jackson, supra note 11; infra Part II.  One sexual assault victim described her 
decision to come forward about her alleged assault by Les Moonves:  “The moment I read that 
there were other women [Les Moonves] had victimized, the light bulb went off . . . .  I had to 
grapple with the fact that I had allowed the same monster to victimize me twice, in the 1990s 
and once again some 20 years later.” See Stewart, Abrams & Gabler, supra note 33. 
 68. See, e.g., McKee v. Cosby, 236 F. Supp. 3d 427, 443 (D. Mass. 2017), aff’d, 874 F.3d 
54 (1st Cir. 2017); Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114, 140–42 (D. Mass. 2015); see also 
Clay Calvert, Counterspeech, Cosby, and Libel Law:  Some Lessons About “Pure Opinion” 
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they made their allegedly defamatory statement to defend their own 
reputations.69  In #MeToo defamation cases, the self-defense argument is that 
the alleged assailant was protecting their own reputation by calling their 
accuser a liar—so they cannot be liable for defamation.70 
Courts have come to inconsistent conclusions on whether an alleged 
assailant who calls their accuser a liar can properly claim the self-defense 
privilege.  The court in Green v. Cosby addressed the self-defense argument 
at the motion to dismiss stage, where the plaintiff’s allegations, in this case 
sexual assault allegations, are presumed to be true.71  The court noted that, 
when a defendant’s allegedly defamatory statement includes material they 
know or believe is false, they cannot successfully claim the self-defense 
privilege.72  Accordingly, the court stated that Cosby could not invoke the 
self-defense privilege at the motion to dismiss stage.73  However, the court 
in McKee v. Cosby74 felt differently, asserting that individuals cannot be 
limited to “no comment” statements when responding to public sexual assault 
allegations.75 
Another legal issue in #MeToo defamation cases is an attorney’s potential 
defamation liability for making statements on behalf of their clients to defend 
them against sexual assault allegations.  This question has been raised in Bill 
Cosby’s #MeToo defamation cases, where Cosby’s attorney, Martin Singer, 
either explicitly or implicitly called Cosby’s accusers liars to defend Cosby 
against sexual assault allegations.76  In most of these cases, Cosby was the 
only named defendant, and the courts treated Singer’s statements as being 
made by Cosby because Singer made them on Cosby’s behalf in the scope of 
 
& Resuscitating the Self-Defense Privilege, 69 FLA. L. REV. 151, 170–78 (2017) (arguing that 
the self-defense privilege should apply to #MeToo “liar” statements in defamation cases); 
Kristina T. Pham & Kevin D. Whittaker, Will Defamation Claims in the #MeToo Movement 
Revive the Self-Defense Privilege for Employers?, 2018 EMERGING ISSUES 8669 (predicting a 
resurgence of the self-defense privilege that may benefit employers). 
 69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  Not all 
jurisdictions recognize the self-defense privilege. See, e.g., Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 140–41 
(rejecting Cosby’s self-defense argument because the applicable Florida law does not 
recognize the self-defense privilege). 
 70. See Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 140–42. 
 71. Id. at 142. 
 72. Id. (citing ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 9:2.1 (4th ed. 2010)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. 236 F. Supp. 3d 427 (D. Mass. 2017), aff’d, 874 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2017). 
 75. Id. at 443.  Despite the conflicting outcomes in these #MeToo cases, the common law 
self-defense privilege may ultimately be favorable to #MeToo defamation suit defendants.  
The common law requires that a reply to a defamatory statement (1) be directed only at the 
initial defamatory attack, without adding irrelevant statements; (2) be proportional to the 
defamatory attack, and (3) be directed to the appropriate—and not an unnecessarily wide—
audience. Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1559–63 (4th Cir. 1994).  Under 
the proportionality requirement, a defendant may properly allege that their attacker “is an 
unmitigated liar.” Id. at 1562 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115 (5th 
ed. 1984)). 
 76. See Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169 (3d Cir. 2016); McKee, 236 F. Supp. 3d 427; 
Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114; Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (Ct. App. 2017). 
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his role as Cosby’s attorney.77  Ultimately, whether attorneys can themselves 
be liable for defamation when acting on behalf of their client for their client’s 
benefit remains largely unexplored.78 
C.  Fact and Opinion:  Fair Comment, Milkovich, and Varying Tests 
Common law courts used fact-opinion analyses to determine whether 
defamation defendants successfully claimed protection under the fair 
comment privilege.79  Later, beginning in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court took on the task of defining and clarifying that 
distinction.80  However, a clear framework for determining whether 
statements constitute fact or opinion has eluded courts.81 
Part I.C.1 describes the common law fact-opinion analysis.  Part I.C.2 
explains how the Supreme Court case Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 
sought to change the common law fact-opinion analysis.  Finally, Part I.C.3 
describes how little effect Milkovich had on the fact-opinion analysis. 
1.  The Fact-Opinion Distinction’s Origins in the Common Law 
Until 1964, when the Supreme Court first acknowledged constitutional 
protection for opinions,82 the fact-opinion distinction existed exclusively 
under the common law.  At common law, the fair comment defense protected 
a defamation defendant’s right to publicly discuss certain public subjects, 
even if done in a defamatory manner.83  Fair comment was the common law’s 
principal mechanism for balancing the need for public discourse with the 
need to redress reputational harm to individuals.84  A defendant could 
successfully claim this qualified privilege by showing that the statement at 
issue concerned a matter of public interest, the statement was based on facts 
either stated or known to the audience, the statement was the defendant’s 
opinion, and the defendant’s sole motivation for the statement was not to 
harm the plaintiff.85 
 
 77. See Hill, 665 F. App’x at 175–76; McKee, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 434; Green, 138 F. Supp. 
3d at 118. 
 78. For an article opining that an attorney should not be liable for defamation when 
speaking for their client, see Calvert, supra note 68, at 165. 
 79. See infra notes 83–86. 
 80. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 81. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:1. 
 82. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (determining “for the first time 
the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to 
award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official 
conduct”); see also Robert D. Sack, Protection of Opinion Under the First Amendment:  
Reflections on Alfred Hill, “Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment,” 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 294, 305 (2000) (explaining the Supreme Court’s concern for protection of 
opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan). 
 83. Rodney W. Ott, Note, Fact and Opinion in Defamation: Recognizing the Formative 
Power of Context, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 763 (1990). 
 84. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990). 
 85. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 606 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
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Fair comment protected pure, as opposed to mixed, opinion.86  Pure 
opinion included two types of statements.  First, where the speaker states 
facts and expresses an opinion based on those facts.87  Second, where the 
speaker does not express the facts on which the opinion is based, but the 
particular facts are either assumed due to their notoriety or known because 
another person has stated them.88  Statements implying the existence of 
undisclosed facts unknown to their audience were referred to as mixed 
opinion and, unlike pure opinion, were actionable for defamation.89 
In famous dictum from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,90 the Supreme Court 
unwittingly laid the groundwork for blanket nonactionability of pure opinion 
when it stated: 
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.  However 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.  But 
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.91 
The Gertz dictum was widely read92 to say that statements of pure opinion 
were not actionable, effectively rendering the fair comment privilege 
unconstitutional.93  In 1977, the Restatement (Second) of Torts rejected the 
possibility of actionable pure opinion94 and instead clarified that opinions are 
“actionable only if [they] impl[y] the allegation of undisclosed defamatory 
facts as the basis for the opinion.”95  Courts subsequently attempted to 
formulate tests for distinguishing fact and opinion pursuant to the Gertz 
dictum and Restatement.96 
The D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision in Ollman v. Evans97 greatly 
influenced the interpretation and application of the fact-opinion distinction.  
Judge Kenneth Starr, writing for the majority, interpreted Gertz as implying 
 
 86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (explaining 
that fair comment was held to apply to pure opinions). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.; see also infra notes 159–63 and accompanying text (expanding on the difference 
between pure and mixed opinion). 
 90. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 91. Id. at 339–40. 
 92. The Gertz dictum “had a deep, virtually instantaneous impact on the law of 
defamation.” ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 4:2.3 (5th ed. 2017).  For a list of 
cases ultimately holding in accordance with the idea that opinions are not actionable under the 
Constitution, see Sack, supra note 82, at 313 nn.102–09. 
 93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmts. b–c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  After 
the Supreme Court issued its Gertz opinion, courts began explicitly holding that Gertz 
rendered fair comment obsolete, referring to fair comment in their opinions but ultimately 
deciding the cases based on the Constitution or declaring fair comment superfluous. SACK, 
supra note 92, § 4:2.3. 
 94. See Sack, supra note 82, at 310. 
 95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see id. § 566 cmt. b. 
 96. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 
977 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (describing the different methods employed by courts to 
distinguish fact from opinion as including judgment calls, single factors like verifiability, and 
multifactor tests). 
 97. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
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a constitutional duty “to distinguish facts from opinions in order to provide 
opinions with the requisite, absolute First Amendment protection.”98  The 
court discussed the problems with different ways of distinguishing between 
fact and opinion.  Bright-line rules fail to account for the complexity and 
richness of the English language, in which words can mean different things 
in different contexts.99  However, analyses based on judgment calls or that 
articulate a complex rule may have an unwanted deterrent effect on free 
speech because it would be impossible for the public to predict what a court 
might deem permissible.100  The Ollman court thus settled on a four-factor 
test to guide its analysis of whether a statement constituted fact or opinion.101 
The Ollman test considers these four factors:  (1) the statement’s specific 
language, including its common usage; (2) the statement’s verifiability; (3) 
the allegedly defamatory statement in the full context of its entire publication; 
and (4) the broader context of the statement’s publication, including the 
implications of social conventions.102  These factors still greatly influence 
courts’ fact-opinion analyses.103 
Two years later, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,104 the 
Supreme Court determined that, under the Constitution, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving an allegedly defamatory statement’s falsity, at least in 
media cases involving matters of public concern.105  The Hepps holding 
marked a further shift from common law defamation, which did not require 
the plaintiff to prove falsity.106 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Fact-Opinion Analysis in Milkovich 
The Supreme Court finally addressed the fact-opinion distinction in 
Milkovich, where the defendant was sued for defamation because he called 
the plaintiff a liar.107 
Michael Milkovich, a high school wrestling coach, had testified at an 
athletics association hearing regarding a violent altercation at a wrestling 
match involving his team.108  The association then put the team on 
probation.109  Subsequently, after parents and wrestlers sued the association 
and Milkovich also testified in that proceeding, the association’s unfavorable 
ruling was overturned.110 
 
 98. Id. at 975. 
 99. Id. at 974–78. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 979. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Sack, supra note 82, at 316 nn.115–16 (listing court opinions using the same or 
similar factors in their fact-opinion analyses).  But see Ott, supra note 83, at 781–84 
(discussing divergent applications of the Ollman factors). 
 104. 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
 105. Id. at 768–69. 
 106. See SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 1:8. 
 107. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990). 
 108. Id. at 3–4. 
 109. Id. at 4. 
 110. Id. 
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The next day, a local newspaper published an article written by a 
columnist, J. Theodore Diadiun, who was present at the wrestling match and 
at the athletics association hearing.111  The column, entitled “Maple Beat the 
Law with the ‘Big Lie,’” claimed that Milkovich had perjured himself at the 
court proceeding.112  In the column, Diadiun stated that “anyone who 
attended the . . . wrestling meet” learned a lesson:  “If you get in a jam, lie 
your way out.  If you’re successful enough, and powerful enough, and can 
sound sincere enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand 
up, regardless of what really happened.”113  Towards the end of the article, 
Diadiun reiterated that “[a]nyone who attended the meet . . . knows in his 
heart that Milkovich . . . lied at the hearing.”114 
The Supreme Court used Milkovich as an opportunity to reject the 
widespread interpretation that Gertz created a blanket constitutional 
protection for all opinion.115  Chief Justice William Rehnquist explained, 
“we do not think this [dictum] from Gertz was intended to create a wholesale 
defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion’” and that 
“such an interpretation . . . would . . . ignore . . . that expressions of ‘opinion’ 
may often imply an assertion of objective fact.”116 
The Court demonstrated how an expression of opinion could imply a 
factual assertion.  First, the Court explained that the statement, “In my 
opinion John Jones is a liar,” could imply a false assertion of fact.117  Even 
if the speaker states the facts on which this opinion is based, those facts could 
be incorrect or incomplete, or the speaker could have incorrectly evaluated 
the facts.118  Second, the Court explained that a statement cannot be protected 
simply because its speaker specifically contextualizes it as an opinion.119  If 
an opinion implies a false assertion of fact, it can be harmful to one’s 
reputation, regardless of whether it was prefaced with “In my opinion” or “I 
think.”120 
The Court further opined that existing constitutional doctrine sufficiently 
protected First Amendment rights.  The Milkovich Court noted that Hepps 
provides constitutional protection for “statement[s] of opinion relating to 
matters of public concern which do[] not contain a provably false factual 
connotation.”121  Additional Supreme Court cases provide constitutional 
protection against statements that contain “rhetorical hyperbole” and that 
cannot, therefore, be “interpreted as stating actual facts” about a person.122  
Finally, Supreme Court cases establishing fault requirements for statements 
 
 111. Id. at 3; see also id. at 28 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 4 (majority opinion). 
 113. Id. at 4–5. 
 114. Id. at 5. 
 115. Id. at 18. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 18–19. 
 119. Id. at 19. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 20. 
 122. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 53–55 (1988)). 
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of opinion regarding matters of both public concern and public figures or 
officials provide further constitutional protection for “robust” “debate on 
public issues.”123 
Accordingly, the Court rejected the use of factor tests commonly used by 
lower courts to identify statements of opinion124 and clarified that “[t]he 
dispositive question [is] whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that 
the statements in the . . . column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich 
perjured himself in a judicial proceeding.”125  In other words, could a 
reasonable factfinder conclude that an allegedly defamatory statement 
implied an assertion of fact?126 
In applying this question to the Milkovich facts, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that Diadiun’s failure to use “loose, figurative, or hyperbolic 
language” and the article’s “general tenor” would indicate to a reader that 
Diadiun “was seriously maintaining that [Milkovich] committed the crime of 
perjury.”127  The Court further concluded that Diadiun’s perjury claim could 
be proved true or false, based on a comparison of Milkovich’s testimony 
before the athletics association and his testimony before the court.128  It thus 
concluded that Diadiun’s “liar” statement was actionable.129 
Notably, the Supreme Court did not use two pieces of context on which a 
lower court had relied in finding that Diadiun’s column constituted 
nonactionable opinion.  In Scott v. News-Herald,130 a sister case to Milkovich, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio considered Diadiun’s article in a defamation suit 
brought by H. Don Scott, the school superintendent who testified with 
Milkovich at both the athletics association hearing and at court and was also 
a target of Diadiun’s column.131  The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Ohio 
Supreme Court relied on the large caption accompanying Diadiun’s article, 
“TD Says,” as well as the article’s placement in the newspaper’s sports 
section, which is “a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and 
hyperbole.”132  Despite its awareness of the Ohio Supreme Court’s use of 
these pieces of context, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to incorporate them 
into its own analysis of the column.133 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice William Brennan agreed with the fact-
opinion rule set out by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion but 
 
 123. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 124. Id. at 19.  The court opined that these factor tests create an “artificial dichotomy” 
between fact and opinion. Id. 
 125. Id. at 21. 
 126. Scholars note that, despite the Court’s desire to eliminate the “artificial dichotomy” 
of factors tests, its own dispositive question does not actually accomplish this objective. See 
Sack, supra note 82, at 322–25. 
 127. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 19. 
 130. 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986). 
 131. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 8. 
 132. Id. at 9 (quoting Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707–08). 
 133. See infra notes 351–56 and accompanying text. 
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disagreed with its application to the facts in Milkovich.134  In particular, he 
disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that Diadiun’s statements implied a 
factual assertion that Milkovich lied.135  Justice Brennan acknowledged that 
Diadiun revealed facts on which the columnist relied, including that Diadiun 
was personally present at the wrestling match where the infamous incident 
occurred and at the athletics association hearing.136  However, Justice 
Brennan also emphasized that Diadiun’s statement shows where the 
columnist began guessing and pointed to language like “probably” and 
“apparently,” to the statement’s tone, and to contextual details like the “TD 
Says” caption.137  Justice Brennan also found it problematic that Diadiun did 
not personally attend the court hearing, did not quote testimony from the 
hearing, and did not have any detailed secondhand information about 
Milkovich’s court statements.138  Based on these details, Justice Brennan 
concluded that Diadiun’s statements could not reasonably be interpreted to 
imply an assertion of fact. 
3.  An Unchanged Landscape:  Fact-Opinion Analyses After Milkovich 
Milkovich’s impact was relatively subtle and did not alleviate the 
confusion around the fact-opinion distinction.139  Although Milkovich 
rejected a blanket protection for opinion, opinions not implying underlying 
facts still receive constitutional protection since they cannot be proved true 
or false.140  Therefore, Milkovich merely shifted the analysis to focus on 
whether allegedly defamatory statements contain provably false factual 
assertions.141 
Courts tend to rely on Milkovich so far as it requires that actionable 
statements contain provably false assertions of fact and provides that 
rhetorical language is not actionable.142  However, courts continue to rely on 
pre-Milkovich case law to assess whether a statement is provably false.143  
Hence, courts still use factors like those applied in Ollman,144 along with 
other fact-opinion tests, despite the Supreme Court’s disapproval of them.145 
 
 134. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 25 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 28. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 29, 32. 
 138. Id. at 29–30. 
 139. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:2; see also Sack, supra note 82, at 322 (stating that 
“Milkovich had little impact on the law”). 
 140. See SACK, supra note 92, § 4:2.4. 
 141. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:2; see also The Supreme Court, 1989 Term—Leading 
Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 129, 219 (1990) (opining that, “[b]ecause the criteria used by lower 
courts since Gertz to distinguish fact from opinion are consistent with Milkovich’s limitations, 
the law of defamation will remain essentially the same in many jurisdictions”). 
 142. SACK, supra note 92, § 4:2.4. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
 145. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 479 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). 
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Three basic fact-opinion approaches persist in state courts:  the 
verifiability test, the undisclosed defamatory facts test, and the totality of the 
circumstances test.146 
Jurisdictions like Illinois147 and New Jersey148 use fact-opinion tests 
emphasizing verifiability, where courts are more likely to find statements 
actionable if they are capable of being proved true or false, and statements 
are protected from liability if they are not verifiable.149  This test requires a 
determination as to whether the statement suggests specific factual assertions 
that can be proved true or false.150  Additionally, statements are less likely to 
be found actionable if they are determined to contain “loose, figurative or 
hyperbolic language.”151  A final element is whether the audience would 
reasonably interpret a statement to have a defamatory meaning, which courts 
assess by considering the context in which the statement appears.152 
Some states, such as Georgia,153 Pennsylvania,154 and Washington155 rely 
on disclosure, the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to the fact-
opinion analysis.156  Under this test, courts are likely to find a statement 
actionable if it fails to disclose the underlying defamatory facts serving as the 
basis of the opinion.157  The Restatement further expands this test by 
distinguishing between pure and mixed opinions.158  Pure opinions are those 
in which the audience knows the underlying facts, either because the speaker 
disclosed them or because they were already aware of them.159  Mixed 
opinions fail to explicitly disclose, but still imply, the existence of underlying 
defamatory facts.160 
This distinction is important because it highlights that an opinion’s impact 
on its audience varies depending on whether it communicates the underlying 
facts.  If the statement of opinion discloses the underlying facts on which the 
opinion is based, the audience is less likely to perceive it as a defamatory 
factual statement.161  For example, the Restatement provides the following 
 
 146. Ott, supra note 83, at 770–74.  Ott’s note predated the Supreme Court’s issuance of 
its Milkovich opinion by a matter of months.  A post-Milkovich analysis of state court fact-
opinion tests distinguishes eight different categories. Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of 
Opinion:  Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 499–552 (1994).  
Most of these factors can be condensed into the three categories described by Ott. 
 147. See Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Publ’g Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 840 (Ill. 2006). 
 148. See DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1269 (N.J. 2004). 
 149. Ott, supra note 83, at 770–71. 
 150. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:45. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.; see also DeAngelis, 847 A.2d at 1268. 
 153. See Davita Inc. v. Nephrology Assocs., P.C., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Ga. 
2003). 
 154. See Sprague v. Porter, No. 02930, 2013 WL 6143734, at *8 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 1, 
2013). 
 155. See Dunlap v. Wayne, 716 P.2d 842, 847 (Wash. 1986) (en banc). 
 156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. § 566 cmt. b. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. § 566 cmt. c. 
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illustration:  “A writes to B about his neighbor C:  ‘I think he must be an 
alcoholic.’”162  The audience, B, could reasonably conclude that A’s opinion 
is based on undisclosed facts—perhaps A saw C acting in a manner that 
would support his opinion that C is an alcoholic.  Compare with the following 
scenario:  “A says to B about C, a city official:  ‘He and his wife took a trip 
on city business a month ago and he added her expenses in as a part of his 
own.’  B responds:  ‘If he did that he is really a thief.’”163  Here, the audience, 
A, would likely understand that B’s opinion is based purely on the facts that 
A himself provided, and that B is therefore not implying a statement of 
defamatory fact. 
Finally, some states, like Massachusetts,164 California,165 and New 
York,166 use the totality of the circumstances fact-opinion analysis.  Under 
this test, courts weigh a number of factors to determine whether the allegedly 
defamatory statement is actionable for defamation.167  These factors can 
include any combination of the statement’s literary context, existence of 
cautionary terms, the statement’s social context, verifiability, and whether 
the statement consists of rhetorical hyperbole.168 
II.  FACT OR OPINION?:  DIFFERING ANALYSES AND DIVERGING RESULTS IN 
#METOO DEFAMATION CASES 
Of the eleven existing defamation cases predicated on a claim that the 
accuser is a liar,169 eight arise from #MeToo-era sexual assault accusations 
and three arise from accusations of criminal conduct, including sexual 
assault, that arose prior to the #MeToo wave in fall 2017.170  This Part 
discusses the eight cases that addressed the fact-opinion distinction.171 
In five of the remaining eight cases, the plaintiff prevailed on the fact-
opinion question.  However, in three others, including cases decided in the 
 
 162. Id. § 566 illus. 3. 
 163. Id. § 566 illus. 5. 
 164. See Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 612 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Mass. 1993). 
 165. See Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 139 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 166. See Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1005 (N.Y. 2014) (explaining that New York 
has “adopted a holistic approach” to the fact-opinion analysis). 
 167. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:47; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 168. SMOLLA, supra note 41, § 6:47. 
 169. This count does not include Milkovich. 
 170. See infra Parts II.A–B.  This count only includes defamation cases with opinions 
issued as of September 19, 2019. 
 171. Two of the eleven cases did not address the fact-opinion distinction.  As of September 
19, 2019, one of these cases has addressed only procedural matters. See Ex parte Moore, No. 
1170638, 2018 WL 3947715 (Ala. Aug. 17, 2018) (affirming a lower court’s denial of Roy 
Moore’s motion for change of venue).  One case was dismissed. See Katelyn Caralle, Judge 
Throws Out Defamation Lawsuit Against Bill O’Reilly, Fox News:  It Is ‘Wholly Insufficient,’ 
WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 6, 2019, 9:42 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/ 
judge-throws-out-defamation-lawsuit-against-bill-oreilly-fox-news [https://perma.cc/5KUU-
LYHS].  Finally, one defamation suit brought against Alan Dershowitz in April 2019 is 
pending as of September 26, 2019. See Tom Winter & Rich Schapiro, Alan Dershowitz:  My 
Sex Abuse Accuser Has Hurt the ‘Me Too’ Movement, NBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2019, 1:32 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/alan-dershowitz-my-sex-abuse-accuser-has-hurt-
me-too-n1058226 [perma.cc/VW8R-5YJG]. 
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First Circuit, Third Circuit, and the Central District of California, the 
defendant prevailed on the fact-opinion analysis. 
Part II.A will assess how the fact-opinion analysis was conducted in cases 
where the court determined that a “liar” allegation was actionable.  Part II.B 
will examine how the fact-opinion analysis was implemented in cases where 
the court determined that a “liar” allegation was not actionable. 
A.  Actionable “Liar” Statements 
In each of the following cases, the court rejected the defendant’s argument 
that his “liar” statement constituted opinion, finding instead that the “liar” 
statement was actionable fact. 
Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2 examine fact-opinion analyses in pre-#MeToo cases 
where the plaintiff accused the defendant, or another person close to the 
defendant, of committing a crime, and the defendant subsequently called the 
plaintiff a liar.  Parts II.A.3, II.A.4, and II.A.5 examine courts’ fact-opinion 
analyses in #MeToo defamation cases. 
1.  Actionable Fact in Davis v. Boeheim 
In Davis v. Boeheim,172 the New York Court of Appeals found that, 
pursuant to a fact-opinion analysis, the allegedly defamatory statements at 
issue were actionable.173  The statements were made by Syracuse University 
and James Boeheim, the university’s head basketball coach, in response to 
the plaintiffs’ claims of sexual abuse by Bernie Fine, the associate head 
coach.174  The plaintiffs, Robert Davis and Michael Lang, alleged that the 
abuse happened in the 1980s, when they were about eleven years old and 
continued for almost twenty years.175  In 2005, Davis reported the abuse to 
the university’s new chancellor, but the university concluded a few months 
later that the allegations were unfounded.176  In 2011, the claims resurfaced 
and Boeheim publicly stated, “‘Bernie [Fine] has my full support,’ and that 
he had known Fine for over 40 years and had ‘never seen or witnessed 
anything to suggest that [Fine] would be involved in any of the activities 
alleged.’”177  Boeheim also said that he “would have taken action” if he had 
known of such conduct.178  Boeheim further called the plaintiffs liars and 
claimed that their allegations were financially motivated.179 
Davis and Lang then commenced a defamation action against Boeheim 
and the university, who in turn filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 
the statements were not defamatory because they constituted nonactionable 
 
 172. 22 N.E.3d 999 (N.Y. 2014). 
 173. Id. at 1001. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1002. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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opinions.180  The trial court granted the motion, and the appellate division 
affirmed, determining that based on the totality of the circumstances, a 
reasonable reader could conclude that the statements constituted 
nonactionable opinion.181  Davis and Lang argued that, contrary to the lower 
courts’ opinions, the statements constituted actionable facts or mixed 
opinion.182 
The New York Court of Appeals agreed with Davis and Lang.183  Using a 
totality of the circumstances test, it examined:  (1) whether the specific 
language of the statement had a readily understood, precise meaning; (2) 
whether the statements were capable of being proved true or false; and (3) 
whether the published or broader social context indicated to a reader that the 
statement was more likely to be opinion rather than fact.184 
The court determined that the first factor was satisfied because Boeheim 
used “specific, easily understood language to communicate that Davis and 
Lang lied, their motive was financial gain, and Davis had made prior similar 
statements for the same reason.”185  The court also found that the second 
factor was met because Boeheim’s assertions that the plaintiffs were 
motivated by money and that Davis had made false statements in the past 
were capable of being proved true or false.186 
In analyzing the third factor, the court invoked the pure and mixed opinion 
distinction laid out in the Restatement187 and determined that Boeheim’s 
statements constituted actionable mixed opinion.188  Specifically, a 
reasonable reader could understand Boeheim to be speaking with authority 
and based on undisclosed facts, given his status as a well-respected member 
of the university.189  Additionally, Boeheim’s position as head coach left him 
“well placed to have information about the charges” and the fact that his 
statement was released before the university’s statement would suggest that 
he had access to otherwise confidential information.190  Further, Boeheim’s 
longtime friendship with Fine suggested that he based his statements on 
particular details known to him because of that existing relationship.191  
Finally, because these statements were published in news-related articles, 
rather than an op-ed or letter to the editor, the reasonable reader would be 
more willing to conclude that they stated or implied facts.192 
 
 180. Id. at 1002–03. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 1005. 
 185. Id. at 1006. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmts. b–c (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(explaining that the difference between pure and mixed opinions is that pure, nonactionable, 
opinions disclose underlying facts whereas mixed, actionable opinions fail to disclose 
underlying facts but imply to their audience that they exist). 
 188. Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1007. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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The New York Court of Appeals thus concluded that Boeheim’s 
allegations that the plaintiffs lied were actionable under a totality of the 
circumstances fact-opinion analysis in light of the statement’s specific 
language, verifiability, and literary and social context.193 
2.  Actionable Fact in Giuffre v. Maxwell 
In Giuffre v. Maxwell,194 the Southern District of New York concluded 
that Ghislaine Maxwell’s claim that Virginia Giuffre lied when she claimed 
Maxwell was involved in her sexual abuse was actionable.195  Giuffre, an 
alleged victim of Jeffrey Epstein’s sex trafficking ring,196 had experienced 
repeated sexual abuse when she was a minor over the span of about three 
years and publicly alleged that Maxwell was involved in her trafficking.197  
In response, Maxwell stated through her agent that these allegations were 
“untrue,” were “shown to be untrue,” and that the “claims are obvious 
lies.”198 
Subsequently, Giuffre filed a defamation claim against Maxwell, and 
Maxwell filed a motion to dismiss, claiming in part that the allegedly 
defamatory statements were not actionable.199  Whereas Maxwell claimed 
her statements did not actually call Giuffre a liar, Giuffre argued they 
effectively did, and the court settled the question through a fact-opinion 
analysis.200 
The court employed the same totality of the circumstances test used in 
Davis v. Boeheim and determined that the statements were actionable.201  
First, the statement was readily understood to have the factual meaning that 
Giuffre lied about Maxwell’s involvement with Giuffre’s sexual abuse, “and 
that some verifiable investigation . . . occurred and [came] to a definitive 
conclusion proving that fact.”202  Further, although Maxwell did not use the 
word “liar,” her claims that Giuffre’s allegations were “obvious lies” and had 
 
 193. See id. at 1002–03, 1005. 
 194. 165 F. Supp. 3d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 195. Id. at 152.  This case subsequently settled in May 2017. Kat Tenbarge, Epstein Files 
Unsealed:  Thousands of Accusers’ Documents Have Been Released from the Defamation Suit 
Against His Ex-Girlfriend and Alleged ‘Madam,’ BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2019, 10:42 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/epstein-giuffre-v-maxwell-unsealed-thousands-documents-
defamation-2019-8 [https://perma.cc/YB83-Z4BH].  In August 2019, court documents from 
this case were unsealed, revealing thousands of pages worth of details about accusations from 
multiple women and involving a number of high-profile men, including Donald Trump and 
Prince Andrew. See id. 
 196. See Sheila Dang et al., Jeffrey Epstein Accuser Links Powerful Men to Financier:  
Civil Court Filing, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2019, 3:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
people-jeffrey-epstein-documents/jeffrey-epstein-accuser-links-powerful-men-to-financier-
civil-court-filing-idUSKCN1UZ27X [https://perma.cc/62SG-T4KM]. 
 197. Giuffre, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 150. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 151. 
 201. Id. at 151–52. 
 202. Id. at 152. 
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been “shown to be untrue” amounted to the same thing, as Giuffre’s 
allegations could not be shown to be untrue without her being a liar.203 
Second, the statements were capable of being proved true or false:  “Sexual 
assault of a minor is a clear-cut issue; either transgression occurred or it did 
not.  Either Maxwell was involved or she was not.  The issue is not a matter 
of opinion . . . .  The answer depends on facts.”204 
Third, the statements’ context would indicate to an audience that facts, not 
opinions, were being communicated.  This is because Maxwell’s agent 
crafted a press release with the intention of releasing it to the media to 
publicly refute Giuffre’s sexual abuse history and Maxwell’s role in it.205 
Thus, the court determined that Maxwell’s implied allegation that Giuffre 
lied was actionable under a totality of the circumstances test that included 
specific language, verifiability, and literary and social context.206 
3.  Actionable Fact in Zervos v. Trump 
In Zervos v. Trump,207 the New York Supreme Court ruled that Donald 
Trump’s assertion that a sexual assault accuser lied was actionable for 
defamation.208  After being “fired” as a contestant on The Apprentice, 
Summer Zervos continued seeking employment opportunities with 
Trump.209  Zervos alleged that during a meeting at Trump’s New York office, 
he kissed her twice and that, at another meeting at the Beverly Hills Hotel, 
he engaged in unwanted sexual contact with her.210 
Zervos decided to come forward about her experiences after Trump 
became the Republican Party presidential nominee, so that the public could 
fully evaluate him as a candidate.211  The next day, Trump released a 
statement denying he met Zervos “at a hotel or greeted her 
inappropriately.”212  Additionally, during a campaign rally, Trump claimed 
that the “allegations are 100% false,” that “[t]hey are made up, they never 
happened,” that “[t]hese claims defy reason, truth, logic, common sense,” 
and that “[t]hey’re made without supporting witnesses.”213  Finally, Trump 
tweeted that nothing “ever happened with any of these women.  Totally made 
up nonsense to steal the election.”214 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 153. 
 206. Id. at 152. 
 207. 74 N.Y.S.3d 442 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App. Div. 2019). 
 208. Id. at 449. 
 209. Id. at 444. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 445. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id.  For a complete account of Trump’s numerous public statements at rallies, debates, 
and on Twitter calling his accusers, including Zervos, liars, see id. at 445–46. 
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Zervos filed suit three days before Trump was sworn in as president of the 
United States.215  She alleged that Trump’s claims, that she lied and had 
political motives, were defamatory.216  Trump then moved for dismissal or 
for a continuance until he left office based on presidential immunity.217 
After rejecting Trump’s presidential immunity argument,218 the court 
employed the totality of the circumstances test articulated in Davis v. 
Boeheim and concluded that Trump’s statements were actionable.219  Trump 
used “specific, easily understood language” to convey that Zervos lied to 
serve personal interests,220 and his statements were capable of being proved 
true or false since they concerned whether Zervos’s goal was to advance her 
own interests.221 
The court put particular emphasis on the third factor—context.  It 
reasoned:  first, Trump was the only person aside from Zervos who knew 
what their interaction was like; second, Trump called Zervos a liar as a matter 
of fact, using language such as “phony stories,” “totally false,” and “fiction”; 
and third, a reasonable audience could understand Trump’s assertions as fact, 
considering that he “knows exactly what transpired.”222  The court also stated 
that the fact that Trump made these assertions on the campaign trail223 did 
not render them protected rhetorical hyperbole.224 
The court therefore found that Trump’s assertions that Zervos was a liar 
were actionable for defamation under a totality of the circumstances test that 
considered specific language, verifiability, and literary and social context.225  
The New York Appellate Division later affirmed this decision.226 
 
 215. Id. at 446. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 446–48.  The Zervos court determined that Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) 
did not preclude this defamation claim, since “[n]o one is above the law” and no authority 
supports the dismissal or stay of a civil action “related purely to unofficial conduct because 
defendant is the President of the United States.” Zervos, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 448. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 449 (quoting Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1006 (N.Y. 2014)). 
 221. Id.  On appeal, the court further explained that the denial of an accusation is not 
automatically actionable for defamation, but once uttered in conjunction with a claim that the 
accuser is lying, the denial becomes actionable as a “specific factual statement about another 
that is reasonably susceptible of defamatory meaning.” Zervos v. Trump, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75, 88 
(App. Div. 2019).  The appellate court also clarified that, though the use of the word “liar” 
could be categorized as nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole, it is not rhetorical hyperbole 
where the defendant uses it as part of a denial of factual allegations against him. Id. at 88–89. 
 222. Zervos, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 449. 
 223. The fact-opinion distinction is often used to shield political expression, including 
outrageous political speech, from defamation liability. SACK, supra note 92, § 4:3.1[B]. 
 224. Zervos, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 449.  But see Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 925 
(C.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that Trump’s “liar” assertions were protected rhetorical hyperbole 
in part because he was responding to accusations from a person who “publicly styl[ed] herself 
as an adversary to the President” by filing a defamation suit against him). 
 225. Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1005 (N.Y. 2014). 
 226. See generally Zervos, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App. Div. 2019). 
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4.  Actionable Fact in Dickinson v. Cosby 
In Dickinson v. Cosby,227 the California Court of Appeal determined that 
statements made by attorney Martin Singer, on behalf of his client Bill 
Cosby, were actionable.228  Janice Dickinson alleged that Cosby drugged and 
raped her in 1982, and though she did not disclose this in her 2002 
autobiography, she did so in a 2014 television interview after other women 
had publicly accused Cosby of drugging and raping them.229  An 
uncorroborated media story reported that Dickinson had wanted to include 
her alleged rape in her autobiography but that Cosby and his attorneys had 
pressured her publisher, HarperCollins, out of it.230  Cosby, through Singer, 
distributed a demand letter to media outlets and issued a press release, calling 
Dickinson a liar in each.231 
Dickinson filed suit against Cosby, claiming in part that he defamed her 
by “publicly brand[ing] her a liar,” and Cosby responded by filing a motion 
under the California “anti-SLAPP statute” designed to limit predatory 
litigation that stifles free speech.232  Because the court determined that Cosby 
met his initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute, the burden shifted to 
Dickinson to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her claim.233  Cosby 
argued that Dickinson could not prevail on her defamation claim regarding 
either the demand letter or the press release because both constituted 
nonactionable opinions.234 
a.  The Demand Letter 
Singer’s demand letter called Dickinson’s rape allegation a “defamatory 
fabrication.”235  The letter attributed to Dickinson the story that Cosby and 
his lawyers pressured HarperCollins into removing details of the alleged rape 
from her autobiography.236  It called this “yet another fabrication . . . just like 
the alleged rape that never happened.”237  Several times, the letter 
encouraged the media outlets to confirm with HarperCollins that Dickinson 
 
 227. 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430 (Ct. App. 2017). 
 228. Id. at 458. 
 229. Id. at 438–39. 
 230. Id. at 439. 
 231. Id. at 439–41. 
 232. Id. at 441.  Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) statutes 
have been enacted across the country in response to predatory litigation initiated to stifle a 
litigation defendant’s free speech rights. Andrew Roth, Comment, Upping the Ante:  
Rethinking Anti-SLAPP Laws in the Age of the Internet, 2016 BYU L. REV. 741, 741–45.  Anti-
SLAPP motions provide a mechanism to “weed[] out, at an early stage, meritless claims 
arising from protected activity.” Dickinson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 442. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 439. 
 237. Id. 
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was lying, as Cosby’s legal team allegedly never had any contact with the 
publisher.238 
The California court used a different version of the totality of the 
circumstances fact-opinion analysis than the New York court used in Davis 
v. Boeheim.  First, the court examined the language itself to determine 
whether the statement disclosed the underlying facts without implying the 
existence of other undisclosed facts justifying the opinion.239  Second, the 
court considered the context of the statement:  to whom the statement was 
directed, the forum in which the statement was made, the statement’s author, 
and whether the statement constituted “predictable opinion” (statements 
made in an adversarial setting).240 
The court determined that the demand letter implied the “provably false 
assertion of fact . . . that Cosby did not rape Dickinson, and she is lying when 
she says that he did.”241  Singer’s characterizations of Dickinson’s 
allegations as “false and outlandish claims,” “outrageous and defamatory 
lie[s],” and a “defamatory fabrication” implied fact rather than opinion.242  
Further, the demand letter did not communicate nonactionable opinion just 
because it disclosed facts regarding Dickinson’s autobiography and claimed 
HarperCollins could confirm that the rape story and assertions that Cosby 
pressured it not to print the story were lies.243  First, even if the letter 
disclosed these facts, it did not disclose all facts on which the opinion was 
based; second, Dickinson’s evidence was that one of these purported facts 
was itself false; and third, the language of the letter stated an additional fact 
that “the alleged rape never happened.”244 
In turning to the context portion of the fact-opinion analysis, the court 
relied heavily on Singer’s role as Cosby’s attorney to support its 
determination that, at the very least, Singer’s letter was capable of being 
interpreted as a factual, absolute denial.245  The court emphasized that this 
was more than an anonymous internet posting; “this was a lawyer’s letter 
threatening litigation and setting out the factual and legal basis for it.”246  
Further, Singer was speaking for Cosby, “who, in turn, would certainly know 
whether or not he sexually assaulted Dickinson.”247 
 
 238. Id. at 439–40. 
 239. Id. at 457. 
 240. Id. at 458.  Statements found to be “predictable opinions” are those made in an 
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b.  The Press Release 
The court determined that the press release, like the demand letter, 
contained statements of fact rendering it actionable.  The press release 
communicated that “Janice Dickinson’s story accusing Bill Cosby of rape is 
a lie” and reiterated the claim that HarperCollins could confirm that Cosby’s 
legal team never tried to discourage it from publishing the rape allegation.248  
Singer used unconditional language and repeated the same facts relied on in 
the demand letter.249 
The press release contained the same problems as the demand letter:  
Singer failed to disclose other facts on which he relied, falsely stated that 
HarperCollins could confirm his story, and expressly stated that Dickinson’s 
allegations were lies.250  The court further relied on context.  In part because 
of the press release’s title, “Statement of Martin D. Singer Attorney for Bill 
Cosby,” and its dissemination to the public, it would be reasonable for the 
average reader to assume that Singer was speaking for Cosby as his 
attorney.251 
The court therefore concluded that both the demand letter and press release 
were actionable as defamation under a totality of the circumstances test that 
considered disclosure and context.252 
5.  Actionable Fact in Green v. Cosby 
In Green v. Cosby,253 the court determined that statements made by 
attorney Martin Singer, on behalf of his client Bill Cosby, were actionable as 
defamation.254  Three different plaintiffs accused Cosby of drugging and 
sexually assaulting them in the 1970s and publicly disclosed the alleged 
assaults between 2005 and 2014.255  In response, Singer made several public 
statements denying the claims and calling the plaintiffs liars.256 
The plaintiffs filed defamation claims alleging that Cosby knew each 
statement was false, that the statements were widely read, and that these 
statements damaged the plaintiffs’ reputations.257  Cosby then filed a motion 
to dismiss,258 arguing in part that the statements at issue expressed statements 
of opinion and were therefore not actionable.259 
 
 248. Id. at 440. 
 249. Id. at 461. 
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 252. See id. at 457–58. 
 253. This case has since been settled. See Graham Bowley, 7 Women Suing Bill Cosby 
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a.  The Newsweek Statement 
In a statement provided to Newsweek, Singer called one of the plaintiff’s 
allegations “a 10-year-old, discredited accusation that proved to be nothing 
at the time, and is still nothing.”260  Cosby argued this was predictable 
opinion, a statement that an audience would understand to be a “one-sided 
expression of opinion rather than fact.”261  The court used a totality of the 
circumstances test that examined whether the general tenor or use of 
figurative or hyperbolic language indicated that the speaker was 
communicating opinion and whether the statement was capable of being 
proved true or false.262 
The court rejected Cosby’s predictable opinion argument in part because 
the statement’s general tenor did not “negate[] the impression that [Cosby] 
was asserting an objective fact.”263  The court further determined that 
Cosby’s specific language had a clear literal meaning, allowing the 
reasonable conclusion that it implied the assertion of a defamatory fact.264  In 
particular, the literal meaning of the statement, that the allegations had been 
proved to be meritless, was not undercut by hyperbolic or figurative 
language.265  Finally, the court determined that the statement was capable of 
being proved true or false.266  Both Cosby’s implication that an investigation 
was conducted and the general “gist” of the statement, that the plaintiff made 
up the allegations, were “sufficiently specific ‘to be susceptible to proof or 
disproof.’”267 
b.  The Statement of November 21, 2014 
In a statement made on November 21, 2014,268 Singer described the 
plaintiff’s sexual assault claims as “unsubstantiated, fantastical stories,” 
adding that “it is completely illogical that so many people would have said 
nothing . . . if they thought they had been assaulted over a span of so many 
years.”269  Cosby argued, among other defenses, that this statement was 
nonactionable because it expressed opinion.270  The court applied Florida’s 
fact-opinion test, which requires that nonactionable opinions provide the 
 
 260. Id. at 121. 
 261. Id. at 132. 
 262. Id. at 131–32. 
 263. Id. at 132.  The court also concluded that, in contrast with relevant California case 
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pending or completed litigation. Id. at 131–32. 
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 267. Id. (quoting James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 890, 898 (Ct. 
App. 1993)). 
 268. This statement was also litigated in Hill. See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 269. Green, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 122. 
 270. Id. at 136. 
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underlying facts on which the opinion is based and that the analysis include 
consideration of context.271 
Cosby argued that the statement provided sufficient underlying facts 
because it described events that allegedly occurred “30, 40, or even 50 years 
ago.”272  However, the court rejected this reasoning because the statement in 
its entirety could be understood to assert more than that the allegations were 
unsubstantiated “but also as implying they were false and entirely without 
merit.”273 
The court therefore determined that the Newsweek statement was 
actionable under a totality of the circumstances fact-opinion analysis that 
considered language and verifiability274 and that the statement of November 
21, 2014, was actionable under a fact-opinion analysis that considered 
disclosure and context.275 
B.  Nonactionable “Liar” Statements 
In each of the following cases, the court determined that the defendant’s 
“liar” statements were not actionable.  Part II.B.1 examines the fact-opinion 
analysis in a non-#MeToo case where the plaintiff accused the defendant of 
committing a crime—and the defendant claimed that the plaintiff lied.  Parts 
II.B.2 and II.B.3 examine fact-opinion analyses in #MeToo defamation 
cases. 
1.  Nonactionable Opinion in Clifford v. Trump 
In Clifford v. Trump,276 a court determined that Donald Trump’s “liar” 
statements were nonactionable in a case where Stephanie Clifford, 
commonly known as Stormy Daniels, brought a defamation suit against 
Trump.277  Clifford claimed that she had an affair with Trump in 2006 and 
that in 2011 she agreed to discuss the affair with a magazine.278  She further 
claimed that a few weeks after agreeing to discuss the affair, a man 
approached and threatened her in an attempt to dissuade her from discussing 
the affair.279  After Trump was elected president, Clifford had a sketch artist 
draw the man who had threatened her and released this sketch to the public 
on April 17, 2018.280  The following day, Trump tweeted:  “A sketch years 
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later about a nonexistent man.  A total con job, playing the Fake News Media 
for Fools (but they know it)!”281 
Clifford then filed a defamation suit against Trump, claiming he “meant to 
convey that [she] is a liar” and “that she was falsely accusing the individual 
depicted in the sketch of committing a crime, where no crime had been 
committed.”282  Trump moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, claiming 
in part that his tweet was nonactionable opinion.283 
The court used a verifiability fact-opinion test that required consideration 
of whether the statement was provably false and whether the statement 
constituted rhetorical hyperbole.284  Clifford satisfied the first prong since 
Trump’s tweet could be proved false if the man who allegedly threatened 
Clifford existed or if Clifford did not lie about the threats.285  However, the 
court found that Clifford failed to satisfy the second prong because Trump’s 
tweet constituted “rhetorical hyperbole” and because of the tweet’s 
context.286 
The court determined that Trump’s tweet constituted “rhetorical 
hyperbole” because Trump used an incredulous tone, which suggested that 
his statement was not intended to be understood as a literal statement about 
Clifford but instead “sought to use language to challenge [her] account.”287  
The court cited the Supreme Court’s holding in Milkovich that a statement 
with a tone characterized as “exaggerated[] and heavily laden with emotional 
rhetoric and moral outrage” made that statement nonactionable rhetorical 
hyperbole.288 
The court next found contextual support for its conclusion that Trump’s 
tweet constituted rhetorical hyperbole.  First, Clifford presented herself as a 
political adversary to the president, and Trump’s response to such a person 
could properly be characterized as political rhetorical hyperbole.289  The 
court analogized the facts to those of a case where the defendant, who had 
run for office against a public official, included various defamatory 
statements about the public official on his website.290  Because the “website’s 
tone” and “campaign context” suggested political rhetorical hyperbole, the 
defendant’s statements could not properly be found to constitute 
defamation.291  Similarly, because Clifford publicly presented herself as a 
 
 281. Id.; see also Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 18, 2018, 6:08 
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 283. Id. at 918, 920. 
 284. Id. at 926.  Although the court also includes the actual malice fault standard in its 
“Bentley/Milkovich” test, it is omitted from this discussion since it is not part of the fact-
opinion analysis. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 926–27. 
 289. Id. at 927. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
2019] MILKOVICH, #METOO, AND LIARS 721 
“political adversary” to Trump, having previously challenged the legitimacy 
of his 2016 election, the court determined that Trump’s tweet was rhetorical 
hyperbole.292 
Second, the court found that context supported a conclusion that Trump’s 
tweet constituted rhetorical hyperbole because he made a single statement, 
rather than a sustained attack on Clifford.293  The court distinguished the facts 
from a case in which a talk show host repeatedly claimed on air that he had 
proof that a judge was corrupt.294  In this case, the court determined that the 
talk show host’s statements were actionable due to his repeated efforts, 
spanning months, to prove that the judge was corrupt.295  Here, because 
Trump neither repeated the allegations nor provided support for his views, 
the court found the cases sufficiently distinct to conclude that Trump’s tweet 
was rhetorical hyperbole, and thus the court found that the tweet was 
nonactionable opinion under a verifiability296 fact-opinion test.297 
2.  Nonactionable Opinion in Hill v. Cosby 
In Hill v. Cosby, the Third Circuit concluded that statements made by 
Cosby, his attorney Martin Singer, and his wife Camille Cosby were all 
nonactionable pure opinion.  Renita Hill alleged that Cosby drugged and 
sexually assaulted her in the 1980s, beginning when she was sixteen years 
old.298  Too intimidated at the time of the abuse to disclose it, Hill later felt 
encouraged by numerous other women who publicly came forward about 
their sexual abuse by Cosby.299  She then shared her own story with a reporter 
in 2014.300  Hill filed a suit in response to three statements, each spoken by 
or on behalf of Cosby, claiming that each defamed her.301 
The court relied on the language of the Restatement, that a statement is not 
defamatory unless it implies the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts, 
to analyze the fact-opinion question in each of these statements.302 
a.  Singer’s Statement 
Singer characterized303 Hill’s sexual assault claims as “unsubstantiated, 
fantastical stories.”304  He further stated that it is “completely illogical that 
 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 568–74 (Tex. 2002). 
 296. See Clifford, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 926. 
 297. Id. at 928. 
 298. Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169, 171 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 173. 
 302. Id. at 175. 
 303. This statement was also litigated in Green. See supra Part II.A.5.b. 
 304. Hill, 665 F. App’x at 172. 
722 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
so many people would have said . . . [or] done nothing . . . if they thought 
they had been assaulted over a span of so many years.”305 
The court concluded that Singer’s statement represented an opinion 
supported by sufficient disclosed facts to render it nonactionable.306  
Specifically, the statement included details and explanations such as the 
alleged abuse having “occurred 30, 40, or even 50 years ago,” the “absurdity” 
that a sexual assault victim would remain silent for so many years, and that 
“[t]here has never been a shortage of lawyers willing to represent people with 
claims against rich, powerful men, so it makes no sense that” these women 
never took legal action at the time they were allegedly assaulted.307  
According to the court, these details from Singer’s statements were sufficient 
to “allow[] the recipient to draw his or her own conclusions ‘on the basis of 
an independent evaluation of the facts.’”308  Therefore, the court determined 
that Singer’s statements were nonactionable. 
b.  Bill Cosby’s Statement 
The court also found Bill Cosby’s statement nonactionable because it also 
disclosed sufficient underlying facts.309  Cosby stated:  “I know people are 
tired of me not saying anything, but a guy doesn’t have to answer to 
innuendos.  People should fact-check.  People shouldn’t have to go through 
that and shouldn’t answer to innuendos.”310 
The court determined that Cosby’s labelling of Hill’s sexual assault 
allegations as “innuendos” served the purpose of explaining why he refused 
to respond to them.311  Further, Cosby “invited the recipient to conduct his 
or her own investigation,” which the court determined was dissimilar to 
calling Hill a liar.312  Although the court did not find that Cosby disclosed 
underlying facts, it found it sufficient that Cosby invited the public to “fact-
check” and thus did not find his statement to be actionable.313 
c.  Camille Cosby’s Statements 
Finally, the court determined that Camille Cosby’s statements were 
nonactionable.  Camille Cosby said, “[t]here appears to be no vetting of my 
husband’s accusers before stories are published or aired.”314  Further, she 
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compared the rape allegations against Cosby to the fabricated rape 
allegations at the University of Virginia.315 
The court stated that even if the statements concerned Hill, they could not 
reasonably be understood to imply undisclosed facts.316  The court further 
determined that a reasonable audience would understand that, as Cosby’s 
wife, Camille Cosby would defend her husband against any allegations of 
wrongdoing without implicating any underlying facts regarding a specific 
accusation.317 
Thus, under a disclosure fact-opinion analysis,318 the court found that the 
three statements made by Singer, Bill Cosby, and Camille Cosby constituted 
nonactionable opinions. 
3.  Nonactionable Opinion in McKee v. Cosby 
The court in McKee v. Cosby319 determined that a statement made by 
Singer constituted nonactionable opinion.320  In December 2014, after over 
twenty other women had come forward with sexual assault allegations 
against Cosby, Kathrine McKee revealed her own allegations that Cosby had 
raped her in 1974.321  After the New York Daily News published a story about 
McKee’s allegations, Singer immediately sent the newspaper a letter 
admonishing it for publishing the story.322  The statement asserted that the 
Daily News failed to uphold a “credibility threshold” and failed to investigate 
“[a]mple . . . readily available” evidence demonstrating McKee’s lack of 
reliability and credibility.323  Singer further provided a list of statements 
McKee had allegedly made about her relationship with Cosby and her past 
occupation as a Las Vegas showgirl.324  Each piece of information in this list 
included citations to news articles and other sources.325  McKee alleged that 
Singer leaked copies of this letter to the media, the letters were widely 
disseminated, and the letter was defamatory.326 
After McKee sued Cosby for defamation, Cosby filed a motion to 
dismiss.327  The court granted the motion on the grounds that the letter 
conveyed Singer’s opinion that McKee was not credible, McKee’s credibility 
was incapable of being proved true or false, and that the Daily News failed to 
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investigate.328  On appeal, Cosby argued that Singer’s letter focused on the 
Daily News’s conduct rather than on McKee’s,329 while McKee argued that 
a reader could conclude that Singer’s assertions were based on undisclosed 
facts.330 
The court implemented a fact-opinion analysis that focused on whether the 
speaker disclosed the facts on which their opinion relied.331  The court 
disagreed with Cosby’s argument that the letter did not adequately concern 
McKee and thus did not defame her.332  The court observed that most of the 
letter’s contents related to McKee’s relationship with Cosby and her 
credibility rather than her “alleged general propensity to lie.”333 
However, the court further found that Singer’s letter disclosed sufficient 
facts to protect it from actionability.334  The court cited the letter’s “heavy” 
inclusion of citations to other sources, indicating “extensive underlying 
facts” to support Singer’s contention that McKee lacked credibility.335  
According to the court, whether the facts were probative was irrelevant to the 
fact-opinion analysis, as long as the facts “[we]re not both false and 
defamatory.”336  Finally, the court concluded that “a reasonable reader would 
not understand Singer ‘to be suggesting that he was singularly capable of 
evaluating’ McKee’s credibility based on undisclosed evidence.”337  Rather, 
readers could draw their own conclusions from the sources provided in the 
letter.338  Therefore, the court concluded that Singer’s letter was not 
actionable for defamation under a disclosure fact-opinion analysis.339 
III.  A FACT-OPINION ANALYSIS EXPLICITLY INCLUDING THE DEFAMATION 
DEFENDANT’S FIRST-PERSON WITNESS ROLE 
Until recent #MeToo-era cases, courts have not had much opportunity to 
address the fact-opinion analysis in fact patterns similar to Milkovich,340 
where the defendant has firsthand knowledge of the crime underlying the 
defamation suit.  However, the resurgence of the Milkovich fact pattern in the 
#MeToo context highlights the need to reexamine how the Court analyzed 
the fact-opinion distinction in Milkovich and how that analysis informs the 
way the fact-opinion analysis in #MeToo cases should be conducted. 
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This Note proposes that fact-opinion analyses should incorporate the 
defamation defendant’s first-person experience with the alleged underlying 
crime that they were accused of committing.  Because the defendant was 
alleged by their accuser to have been present and involved in the commission 
of the crime, they are effectively a potential first-person witness to the crime.  
When a defendant is a first-person witness, their assertion that the plaintiff 
lied is an implicit use of first-person witness testimony and therefore 
constitutes reliance on undisclosed underlying facts.341 
Part III.A revisits the Milkovich defendant’s experience as a first-person 
witness, as well as the analogous #MeToo defendant’s role as a first-person 
witness.  Part III.B proposes a fact-opinion analysis focusing on the 
defendant’s role as first-person witness to the underlying crime and examines 
how successfully the cases presented in Part II considered this factor in their 
fact-opinion analyses. 
A.  Reexamining the Role of Disclosure When a Defamation Defendant Is a 
First-Person Witness to the Underlying Crime 
The fact-opinion analyses utilized by courts in factually similar 
circumstances342 to Milkovich demonstrate that courts use different tests343 
and apply similar tests differently.344  Additionally, many courts fail to 
recognize the portion of Milkovich most relevant to this particular factual 
scenario:  where the defendant was a first-person witness to the underlying 
events at issue, the defendant possesses undisclosed underlying facts.  Thus, 
an allegation that the plaintiff lied, spoken by a defendant who allegedly has 
first-person experience with the incident in question, should be found to be 
actionable. 
This is the case both in Milkovich and in #MeToo defamation cases.  Part 
III.A.1 revisits Milkovich to examine how the defendant’s role as a first-
person witness played into the Supreme Court’s fact-opinion analysis.  Part 
III.A.2 draws a parallel between the Milkovich defendant’s role as a first-
person witness to the events underlying the defamation claim and the 
#MeToo defendant’s role as first person witness to the alleged sexual assault 
and argues that the #MeToo defendant’s first-person witness role should 
likewise affect the fact-opinion analysis. 
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1.  The Milkovich Defendant as First-Person Witness and Possessor of 
Undisclosed Underlying Facts 
In Milkovich, Diadiun’s statement included several indications that his 
assertions that Milkovich lied were based on undisclosed underlying facts 
that he possessed because of his personal experience.  In his column, Diadiun 
stated that he was “among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet” and that he 
“also attended the [athletics association] hearing,” putting him in “a unique 
position of being the only non-involved party to observe both the meet itself 
and the Milkovich-Scott version presented to the board.”345  Diadiun also 
stated that the school’s student body and “anyone who attended the . . . 
wrestling meet” learned a lesson from Milkovich about lying to get out of a 
“jam.”346  He further stated that “[a]nyone who attended the meet,” including 
an “impartial observer, knows in his heart” that Milkovich committed perjury 
at the hearing.347  Diadiun’s statement, that one had to be present at these 
events to conclude Milkovich lied, implied that there was relevant 
information that could only be gleaned by one’s presence at both events.  In 
other words, Diadiun’s assertion implied the existence of undisclosed facts 
underlying his opinion.348 
The Supreme Court’s fact-opinion analysis in Milkovich is consistent with 
Diadiun’s possession of undisclosed facts due to his experience as a first-
person witness.  The court determined that the statement was verifiable 
because it could objectively be proved true or false and because it lacked “the 
sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language” which would indicate a 
statement incapable of being proved true or false.349  Although Diadiun used 
language like “knows in his heart,” which could conceivably be found to be 
hyperbolic,350 the hyperbole is cut down by the rest of his assertion, that 
anyone who attended the wrestling meet and therefore had access to 
information observable at the meet would “know[] in his heart” that 
Milkovich lied. 
The Court further determined that the statement’s general tenor indicated 
the statement was verifiable.351  However, in so concluding, it declined to 
lend analytical weight to contextual evidence of the column’s caption, “TD 
Says,” and the column’s placement in the sports section.352  The Court 
acknowledged that the Ohio Supreme Court relied on these details in 
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concluding, in a sister opinion,353 that Diadiun’s statements were not 
actionable.354  The Ohio Supreme Court specifically read Diadiun’s column 
as presenting his view, “based upon [his] having witnessed the original 
altercation and [athletics association] hearing” that Milkovich lied.355  
However, it ultimately interpreted Diadiun’s statements to be nonactionable 
opinion because, according to the Ohio Supreme Court, “Diadiun [was] not 
making an attempt to be impartial.”356 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgement and ultimate rejection of the 
Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis supports the Court’s opposite interpretation 
of Diadiun’s reliance on firsthand experience.  Rather than constituting 
nonactionable opinion, Diadiun’s statement constituted actionable fact 
because his presence at the wrestling meet and hearing implicated reliance 
on undisclosed underlying facts.  The Court’s fact-opinion analysis in 
Milkovich therefore supports a reading that Diadiun’s role as firsthand 
witness moved the outcome of the fact-opinion analysis in Milkovich’s favor. 
2.  The #MeToo Defamation Defendant as First-Person Witness and 
Possessor of Undisclosed Underlying Facts 
The #MeToo defendant’s experience as firsthand witness to the alleged 
underlying crime should likewise impact the fact-opinion analysis in 
#MeToo defamation cases. 
Allegations of sexual assault are unique as an underlying crime to a 
defamation claim because the accused assailant has firsthand knowledge of 
what happened.  Thus, like Diadiun in Milkovich, the defendants in #MeToo 
defamation cases are firsthand witnesses to the alleged underlying crime, a 
fact which is key to a fact-opinion analysis.  When a #MeToo defendant, in 
defending himself against sexual assault allegations,357 calls his accuser a 
liar, he invokes the existence of undisclosed facts to which he is personally 
privy.  It is therefore not merely a matter of the defendant’s opinion that the 
plaintiff allegedly lied; the defendant necessarily presents such a statement 
as one of fact because the defendant himself would know for a fact whether 
the plaintiff lied. 
#MeToo defamation defendants who are not the alleged assailants, but are 
nevertheless close to the alleged assailant, also have access to undisclosed 
facts underlying their statements that the accuser lied.358  Because these 
defendants possess undisclosed facts as a result of their relationship with the 
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728 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
alleged assailant, their “liar” statements should likewise be found 
actionable.359 
The analysis does not differ in #MeToo defamation cases involving 
statements made by the defendants’ attorney on their behalf.  In these cases, 
although the attorney made one or more of the statements at issue, the 
attorney’s client is the named defendant in the defamation suit.360  Further, 
an audience to a statement made by an attorney on their client’s behalf would 
likely not understand the attorney to have first-person knowledge of the 
sexual assault.  Rather, the attorney represents their client’s perspective on 
the sexual assault allegation in a role commonly understood to be dutifully 
representing their client’s response.361  However, the attorney’s role as their 
client’s mouthpiece in this context accomplishes the same end:  the attorney 
represents the views of their client, the first-person witness to the alleged 
sexual assault.362  Therefore, statements made by attorneys on behalf of 
clients should be subject to the same analysis and would likely be found 
actionable. 
B.  A Proper Framework for the Fact-Opinion Analysis Where the 
Defamation Defendant Is a First-Person Witness to the Underlying Alleged 
Crime 
In defamation cases predicated on an underlying allegation that the 
defendant committed a crime, the fact-opinion analysis should consider the 
defendant’s firsthand knowledge of the alleged underlying crime.  The first-
person witness consideration also applies to defendants who are close to the 
alleged assailant or speak for them as their attorney. 
Inclusion of additional analytical components into a fact-opinion analysis, 
such as the statement’s language, verifiability, and context, should be limited 
to their relevance to the defendant’s role as a first-person witness to the 
alleged crime.  These other factors should not be used to expand the analysis 
beyond consideration of the defendant’s role as a first-person witness. 
Finally, when applied to #MeToo defamation cases, this fact-opinion 
analysis should yield the conclusion that the defendant’s “liar” statement is 
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defamatory statements were made by Cosby’s attorney). 
 362. See supra Part I.B. 
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actionable.363  This is because the defendant, in having called the plaintiff a 
liar, implied possession of undisclosed facts underlying this claim.  
Conversely, where the defendant is not a first-person witness and does not 
have direct access to a first-person witness, their “liar” statement should be 
found nonactionable. 
Part III.B.1 singles out the cases discussed in Part II that incorporate the 
defendant’s first-person knowledge into their fact-opinion analyses.  Part 
III.B.2 explains which cases discussed in Part II failed to include the 
defendant’s first-person witness role in their fact-opinion analyses. 
1.  Application of the First-Person Witness Framework:  The #MeToo 
Defamation Cases That Considered the First-Person Witness Role in Their 
Fact-Opinion Analyses 
Out of the eight cases discussed in Part II, three consider the defendant’s 
role as a first-person witness, or their closeness to the first-person witness, in 
their fact-opinion analyses and conclude that the “liar” statements were 
actionable.364  One case also considered a defendant’s closeness to the first-
person witness and correctly determined that the statement was not 
actionable.365 
The court in Zervos v. Trump366 acknowledged that Trump was “the only 
person other than [Zervos] who knows what happened between the two of 
them” and that an audience to his statements would be “cognizant that 
[Trump] knows exactly what transpired.”367  Thus, although the court’s 
analysis included other analytical elements that did not focus on Trump’s role 
as a first-person witness, it nevertheless afforded this concept analytical 
weight in determining that Trump’s statements were actionable. 
In Davis v. Boeheim, the New York Court of Appeals based its conclusion 
that the allegedly defamatory statements at issue were actionable partially on 
a consideration of the defendant’s firsthand experience.368  In this case, 
James Boeheim claimed that Robert Davis and Michael Lang lied about 
having been sexually abused by their former basketball coach, Bernie 
Fine.369  The court considered that an audience to Boeheim’s statements 
could understand him to be in possession of undisclosed facts.370  This was 
in part due to Boeheim’s longtime friendship with Fine, which could suggest 
that Boeheim had particular knowledge about Fine due to the relationship.371  
 
 363. This analysis is limited to the fact-opinion determination.  Other parts of the 
defamation analysis may still preclude the #MeToo plaintiff from succeeding on her 
defamation claim against her alleged assaulter. 
 364. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3–4. 
 365. See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
 366. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 367. See Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442, 448–49 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 
75 (App. Div. 2019). 
 368. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 369. See Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1001–02 (N.Y. 2014). 
 370. See id. at 1007. 
 371. See id. 
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In this case, Boeheim was not the alleged assailant but was a person close to 
the alleged assailant,372 and the court properly relied on Boeheim’s 
friendship with Fine in concluding that Boeheim’s remarks were actionable 
because Boeheim had access to the first-person witness to the underlying 
alleged crime. 
In Dickinson v. Cosby,373 the court largely based its conclusion that the 
statements at issue were actionable on other analytical elements but 
acknowledged attorney Martin Singer’s position as a mouthpiece for Cosby, 
who “would certainly know whether or not he sexually assaulted 
Dickinson.”374 
The court in Hill v. Cosby considered Camille Cosby’s close relationship 
with her husband in determining that her statement was nonactionable 
opinion.  This Note argues that when a defendant is close to the alleged 
assailant,375 the court should conclude that the statement is actionable 
because the defendant likely possesses undisclosed facts pursuant to the 
relationship.  However, the court correctly concluded that Camille Cosby’s 
statement was not actionable because a spousal relationship is unique.  As 
the court stated, a reasonable audience would understand that Camille Cosby 
would defend her husband without implicating underlying facts relating to 
the sexual assault allegations.376  Additionally, no reasonable audience would 
understand a spouse to be acting as a mouthpiece as they would understand 
an attorney to be communicating for their client in a legal matter.377  The Hill 
court therefore properly considered Camille Cosby’s spousal relationship 
with Bill Cosby in determining that her statement was not actionable. 
The Davis, Dickinson, and Zervos courts relied in part on the defendant’s 
possession of first-person knowledge in rejecting the existence of an opinion 
protection.378  However, some of these courts were not as explicit about the 
importance of the first-person knowledge as they could have been.  While the 
Davis and Dickinson courts identified and, to varying degrees, relied on the 
defendant’s personal knowledge,379 only the Zervos court expressly 
recognized and relied on the importance of Trump’s firsthand knowledge of 
the underlying alleged sexual assault.380 
Finally, although the Hill court properly considered Camille Cosby’s 
unique spousal relationship with Bill Cosby and determined that her 
statement was not actionable, it failed to consider Cosby and Singer’s legal 
 
 372. See id. at 1001, 1007. 
 373. See supra Part II.A.5. 
 374. See Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430, 460 (Ct. App. 2017). 
 375. Such as James Boeheim, who had a close relationship with Bernie Fine in Davis. See 
supra Part II.A.1. 
 376. See Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 377. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 378. See Dickinson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 460; Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1007 (N.Y. 
2014); Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442, 449 (Sup. Ct. 2018), aff’d, 94 N.Y.S.3d 75 (App. 
Div. 2019). 
 379. See Dickinson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 460; Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1007. 
 380. See Zervos, 74 N.Y.S.3d at 449. 
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relationship and resulting firsthand knowledge of the underlying alleged 
sexual assault in analyzing whether their statements were actionable.381 
2.  Application of the First-Person Witness Framework:  The #MeToo 
Defamation Cases That Failed to Consider the First-Person Witness Role in 
Their Fact-Opinion Analyses 
Notably, all of the cases that found the statements at issue to be 
nonactionable failed to consider the defendant’s first-person witness role in 
conducting a fact-opinion analysis.382 
The court in Clifford v. Trump failed to include reference to Trump’s role 
as first-person witness to the alleged underlying crime.383  Instead, the court 
focused its fact-opinion analysis on verifiability and whether Trump’s 
statements were political rhetorical hyperbole.384 
In Hill v. Cosby, the court’s fact-opinion analysis focused on disclosure 
but to a literal degree.385  Rather than exploring whether Cosby, as first-
person witness to the underlying sexual assault crime, had access to 
undisclosed facts, the court determined that Singer and Cosby’s statements 
contained sufficient references to other sources of underlying facts to render 
them nonactionable.386 
Finally, although the court in McKee v. Cosby relied heavily on disclosure 
in its fact-opinion analysis, it did not consider whether the defendant, as first-
person witness, had access to undisclosed underlying facts.387  Instead, it 
concluded that the statement, written by Cosby’s attorney and containing 
numerous citations to publicly available sources, disclosed sufficient 
underlying facts to make it nonactionable.388 
Two #MeToo defamation cases where the statements at issue were found 
to be actionable did not consider the defendant’s role as first-person witness: 
Green v. Cosby389 and Giuffre v. Maxwell.390  In Green, the court focused its 
analysis on the statements’ general tenor,391 verifiability,392 and specific 
language.393  The court failed to lend analytical weight to Cosby’s first-
person experience even though this Cosby case involved a statement spoken 
directly by Cosby rather than through his attorney.  The court in Giuffre used 
 
 381. See Hill, 665 F. App’x at 175–76. 
 382. See id.; supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3.  But see supra Part III.B.1 (explaining that the Hill 
court properly determined that Camille Cosby’s statement was not actionable because of her 
spousal relationship with Bill Cosby). 
 383. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 384. See Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 
 385. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 386. See Hill, 665 F. App’x at 175–76. 
 387. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 388. See McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 675 
(2019). 
 389. See supra Part II.A.5. 
 390. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 391. See Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114, 131–32 (D. Mass. 2015). 
 392. See id. at 133. 
 393. See id. at 133, 136–37. 
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a totality of the circumstances fact-opinion analysis that also failed to 
consider Maxwell’s personal knowledge of the alleged underlying events in 
concluding that Maxwell’s statement was actionable.394 
Overall, courts have largely failed to adequately consider defendants’ first-
person witness role in defamation cases predicated on an underlying 
allegation that the defendant, or a person close to them, committed a crime.  
Only three courts out of the eight discussed in Part II gave analytical weight 
to the defendant’s first-person knowledge,395 whereas the remaining five 
failed to raise this factor in their fact-opinion analyses.396 
CONCLUSION 
The #MeToo movement has brought new light to problems with the 
current application of the fact-opinion analysis across the country.  The 
Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. did not provide 
particularly effective closure to the confusion and inconsistency surrounding 
the fact-opinion analysis.  But Milkovich informs how the analysis can be 
properly implemented, at least in cases where the defendant is a first-person 
witness to the underlying crime. 
Although some of the courts that addressed #MeToo or #MeToo-related 
cases acknowledged the defendant’s role as first-person witness to the 
alleged sexual assault,397 only the New York Supreme Court, in Zervos v. 
Trump, explicitly focused its fact-opinion analysis on this factor.398  
However, the law in Milkovich supports such a focus in fact-opinion analyses 
and yields the conclusion that #MeToo defendants are not protected by the 
fact-opinion distinction. 
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